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We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where workers can engage in search
while on the job. We show that on-the-job search is a key component in explaining labor
market dynamics in models of equilibrium unemployment. The model predicts ﬂuctu-
ations of unemployment, vacancies, and labor productivity whose relative magnitudes
replicate the data. A standard search and matching model suggests much lower volati-
tilities of these variables. Intuitively, in a boom, rising search activity on the job avoids
excessive tightening of the labor market for expanding ﬁrms. This keeps wage pressures
low, thus further increasing ﬁrms’ incentives to post new jobs. Labor market tightness
as measured by the vacancy-unemployment ratio is as volatile as in the data. The in-
teraction between on-the-job search and job creation also generates a strong internal
propagation mechanism.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent research by Hall (2003) and Shimer (2003) shows that search and matching models
along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) can explain the cyclical dynamics of
the labor market only by assuming implausibly large productivity shocks. In particular,
the standard framework underpredicts the volatility of vacancies and unemployment. Both
Hall and Shimer explore real wage rigidity as a solution to this shortcoming. With this
mechanism, ﬁrms’ incentives to create new jobs in a boom are kept high since workers do not
share the returns through bargaining. Hence, more vacancies are posted, and unemployment
falls. This argument rests on the vacancy-unemployment ratio entering wages, reﬂecting
workers’ outside options. Thus, when wages are not rigid, but continuously renegotiated,
they are excessively volatile.
We argue in this paper that on-the-job search oﬀers an alternative resolution to this
puzzle. In a boom, rising search activity by employed workers expands the pool of potential
hires for ﬁrms, in addition to those searching from unemployment. As a consequence, the
bargaining power of incumbent and newly hired workers rises by much less than would be
suggested by the standard vacancy-unemployment ratio. Wages are endogenously rigid in
the presence of on-the-job search.
To quantitatively assess this argument, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model
with labor market frictions and search by employed and unemployed workers. Search on
the job is motivated in a straightforward manner by the presence of two types of jobs,
which diﬀer in terms of proﬁtability and thus wages. Workers in low-wage (‘bad’) jobs
search in order to gain employment in high-wage (‘good’) jobs. Good job vacancies can be
matched with employed and unemployed job seekers, whereas ﬁrms in the bad job sector
only hire unemployed workers. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining for each matched
job-worker unit and continuously renegotiated. We calibrate the model to match salient
long-run features of job and worker ﬂows.
We ﬁnd that our model correctly predicts the observed volatility of the vacancy-unemploy-
ment ratio. At the same time, the ratio of vacancies to unemployed and employed job
seekers is substantially less volatile. Employed workers’ search activity responds strongly to
a positive aggregate shock to take advantage of the increased availability of good employ-
ment opportunities. Job-to-job ﬂows increase substantially. But as search on the job rises,
and wage increases are muted, the incentive to create vacancies remains large, especially
for good jobs. The corresponding fall in unemployment is also large. This is achieved even
2though productivity shocks are of plausible magnitude and wages are, a priori, fully ﬂexible.
Moreover, on-the-job search yields a powerful internal propagation mechanism in that small
aggregate impulses engender large and long-lasting responses of output and employment.
Important for the ability of the model to match the data is the interaction of two features:
the endogeneity of on-the-job search and the heterogeneity of jobs. The former ampliﬁes the
incentives to create good jobs in a boom, since the likelihood of ﬁlling a vacancy remains
large, in spite of falling unemployment. The latter, that is, the increasing availability of
good vacancies, raises employed workers’ search eﬀort. Without either element, the response
of job-to-job transitions and the propagation of shocks on output would be much weaker.
This complementarity explains the prolonged eﬀect of shocks. Furthermore, not only are
more new jobs created, but the job composition shifts towards more productive jobs, which
raises aggregate output.
The model’s implications are in line with other empirical regularities on worker ﬂows
emphasized in the literature. It features a form of vacancy chain, since job-to-job quits
induce creation of bad job vacancies (Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen, 1988, and Contini and
Revelli, 1997). Thus, hiring into new jobs and replacement hiring are strongly procyclical.1
Furthermore, as argued by Okun (1973), booms are associated with a larger supply of good
jobs. Search on the job facilitates the reallocation of workers from bad to good jobs, and
therefore the creation of good jobs in a boom, a point also stressed by Mortensen (1994)
and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). Finally, workers that have been employed for a long
time have lower quit rates, since they are more likely to have made the transition to a good
job.2
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst analysis of on-the-job search in a general equilibrium
business cycle model with equilibrium unemployment. The closest precursors are the con-
tributions by Pissarides (1994) and Mortensen (1994). The former studies a deterministic,
continuous-time model and qualitatively discusses possible adjustment dynamics. It shares
the heterogeneity in job types employed in this paper. The latter conducts a simulation of
a stochastic version of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model. Mortensen shows that
on-the-job search helps explain the negative correlation between job creation and destruc-
tion rates. In both papers, employed search varies through adjustments in the number of
searchers, rather than the intensity of search. Finally, the two papers have exogenous inter-
est rates and prices, shutting down important dynamic general equilibrium eﬀects, which
aﬀect the dynamics of vacancies and unemployment. Neither of the papers considers these
1See also Albaek and Sorensen (1998) for some direct evidence.
2See, for example, Pissarides (1994) for an overview of the relevant empirical ﬁndings.
3dynamics quantitatively.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section gives a brief discussion of the relevant
evidence on the dynamic behavior of the labor market, in particular the quit rate. Section
3 lays out the model and characterizes the steady state. Section 4 gives the calibration
details. The results of the dynamic simulation of the model are presented in section 5,
while section 6 contains further discussion and relates the ﬁndings to the literature. Section
7 concludes. The log-linearized model and remarks on the solution procedure can be found
in the Appendix.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section documents the cyclical behavior of vacancies, unemployment, and labor market
tightness for the U.S. labor market and their relation to productivity, output, employment,
and real wages. While we use labor market data from 1948 until 2003, some other series
cover only a shorter period. In particular, the time series on average hourly earnings which
is only available from 1964 on and which we use as our measure of the real wage (deﬂated
by the CPI). All series are available from the website of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(www.bls.gov), except the series on quits, which has been compiled from the Employment
and Earnings publication of the BLS. This series, however, is only available up to 1982,
when it was discontinued. Vacancies are constructed from the BLS index of help-wanted
advertisements. All variables are quarterly and, where appropriate, detrended using the
HP-ﬁlter, with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.
The dynamics of vacancies and unemployment follow a familiar pattern. Figure 1 shows
vacancies that are highly procyclical whereas unemployment is strongly countercyclical;
that is, the two variables exhibit a Beveridge curve with a contemporaneous correlation
of −0.95. This pattern implies that a measure of labor market tightness, the vacancy-
unemployment ratio, is also highly procyclical. Table 1 presents the standard deviations
and cross-correlations of the variables of interest. Real wages are procyclical, the degree
of which depends on the time period considered.3 Particularly the 1970s feature a highly
procyclical real wage, while from the 1980s on it appears almost acyclical. In fact, for
the full sample, the correlation between output and real wages is 0.57, whereas from 1982
onward it is merely 0.26. For consistency with the theoretical model, we take output per
worker as a measure of labor productivity, which has a correlation with output of 0.69.4
3These results are not reported, but available from the authors.
4Output per hour has a correlation of 0.54 with output.
4One of the central variables for the argument considered in this paper is the rate of job-
to-job mobility and quits, which we consider to be the outcome of on-the-job search activity.
However, there is no direct evidence on the cyclical behavior of on-the-job search that we are
aware of, and we have to rely upon somewhat indirect evidence. Two data sets have become
available recently, but they only cover relatively short periods of time. The Job Openings
and Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS) by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics was begun
in December 2000. This period essentially covers only one mild downturn. Since 1994,
the Current Population Survey uses a “dependent interviewing” technique which allows
contruction of detailed worker ﬂow series. This series thus comprises the protracted boom
of the 1990s as well as the subsequent downturn. This dataset does not allow us, however,
to infer unconditional time series properties of the data, but it is at least useful in providing
long-run averages.
The longest time series on worker mobility and quits is contained in the BLS labor
turnover series for the manufacturing sector from 1926 to 1981, which we use from 1948 on.
We follow Blanchard and Diamond (1989) by making two adjustments based more recent
numbers. First, quit rates in manufacturing tend to be lower than in the entire economy and
therefore need to be adjusted upwards. We use Fallick and Fleischman’s (2004) ﬁnding based
on the CPS data. They ﬁnd an economy-wide average monthly quit rate of 2.6%. Some
caution may be mandated since the data cover only one upswing and one mild downturn.
A long-run average which includes a severe contraction might yield somewhat lower rates.
Secondly, not all quits are job-to-job ﬂows. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) suggest that job-
to-job quits are about half of total quits, while Blanchard and Diamond (1989) postulate
40 percent.
The standard deviation of the adjusted quit series can be found Table 1, based on the
sample up to the end of 1981. It is worth noting that the quit rate is eight times as volatile
as GDP and about 50 percent more volatile than unemployment.5 Figure 1 shows that
the quit rate appears to comove with the vacancy index, especially between about 1955
and 1975. In fact, the detrended series of vacancies and the quit rate for the whole period
have a correlation of 0.94. It appears quite unlikely that the volatilities and short-run
relationships between quits, unemployment, and vacancies have signiﬁcantly changed since
1982. Increasing availability of data from the CPS and JOLTS will allow to be more precise.
5See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000) for evidence on the relative magnitudes of diﬀerent quit ﬂows.
53 A Business Cycle Model with On-the-Job Search
Time is discrete and inﬁnite, and the economy is populated by a representative household,
homogeneous workers and heterogeneous ﬁrms. The key elements of the model are the
heterogeneity of jobs and the endogenously chosen search intensity by employed workers.
There are two types of ﬁrms, labeled ‘good’ and ‘bad’, which diﬀer according to the costs of
creating new jobs. In this respect, the model is similar to Pissarides (1994) and Acemoglu
(2001).6 In the presence of labor market frictions, these costs generate rents which give rise
to equilibrium wage diﬀerentials between job types. The implied diﬀerences in the value
of employment motivate workers in low-wage jobs to search for employment in high-wage
jobs. All workers in low-wage jobs search on the job, but the intensity of their search
depends on labor market conditions, in particular, the likelihood of ﬁnding a good job and
the diﬀerentials in the returns to working. Workers direct their search to either good jobs
or bad jobs, so employed workers approach only good vacancies, while unemployed workers
choose between either job type. Workers in good jobs have no incentive to search as it is
costly and does not oﬀer any improvements over their current returns to employment. We
ﬁrst turn to the nature of the product and labor markets, then discuss the optimization
problems faced by ﬁrms, workers, and the aggregate household.
3.1 Firms and Product Markets
First consider the diﬀerent job, or ﬁrm, types. The cost of creating a job is represented by
a ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy, cg for good ﬁrms, and cb for bad ﬁrms, where cg >c b.




where At is aggregate productivity and n
g
t is employment at good ﬁrms. Analogously, bad
ﬁrms produce according to:
ybt = Atnb
t. (2)
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gt)1/γ (3)
with 1 >γ6=0 , and the corresponding Cobb-Douglas production function for γ =0 .T h e
two intermediate goods, ygt and ybt, are sold at competitively determined prices, Pgt and
6Krause and Lubik (2004) explore the business cycle properties of a model without on-the-job search that
utilizes the two-sector structure in a similar way.
6Pbt:












where we have chosen the price of aggregate output as the numeraire. A similar prod-
uct market structure is used by Acemoglu (2001). It can be interpreted as representing
diﬀerences across industries or diﬀerences across ﬁrms within industries.7
3.2 The Labor Market
The process of matching workers and ﬁrms is subject to frictions, represented by a matching
function, which gives the number of per period matches of job searchers and vacancies. Let
the matching function be constant returns to scale and homogeneous of degree one.8 Both
high-wage and low-wage ﬁrms post vacancies, while employed and unemployed workers
search for jobs. All workers in bad jobs search on the job and choose the intensity of search.
Unemployed workers either search for good jobs or for bad jobs, depending on the relative








t + et), (6)
where v
g
t is the measure of good job vacancies, while the measure of unemployed workers
looking for good jobs is u
g
t. et is the measure of eﬃciency units of search of employed
job seekers, that is, et = stnb
t g i v e st h et o t a la m o u n to fs e a r c ha c t i v i t yb yt h enb
t workers
searching with intensity st. All workers in bad jobs engage in search. Correspondingly, the





Note that unemployed workers search in distinct pools for jobs, and have to make an ex-ante
decision as to which sector they devote their search eﬀort to. Worker mobility implies that,
in equilibrium, the returns to search in either sector have to be equal each period.9
7Evidence by Parent (2000), among others, indicates that a large fraction of job-to-job transitions are
within industries. This is suggestive of intra-industry diﬀerences of jobs motivating worker mobility. Addi-
tional evidence comes from Albaek and Sorensen (1998), who ﬁnd that ﬂows of workers in upturns typically
are from small ﬁr m st ol a r g eﬁrms.
8This assumption is usually based on empirical ﬁndings, such as those by Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
Note, however, that these estimates ignore the presence of job-to-job ﬂows. For a thorough discussion of the
biases this may lead to, see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
9Alternatives to the directed search assumption are discussed below.
7The probabilities of ﬁnding a match for the participants in the matching market are as




































t + et) and θb
t = vb
t/ub
t are measures of labor market tightness in the
matching markets for good jobs and bad jobs, respectively. Match probabilities for ﬁrms
fall ceteris paribus with the number of vacancies posted, and rise with the number of job
seekers. Unemployed job seekers are assumed to search with ﬁxed search intensity (equal























Note that employed job seekers and unemployed job seekers cause congestion for each other
in the market for good jobs.10 Employed job seekers choose the intensity of their search,
denoted by st, taking the aggregate probability of ﬁnding a good job as given. Thus, an
employed worker’s probability of being matched is stp
g
t.
The evolution of employment in good and bad jobs is described by the equations:
n
g












where ρ is the probability of matches breaking up, which is exogenous and identical for
both types of jobs. It comprises both job destruction events and separations of workers for
reasons other than quits to another employer. The last term in the second equation can






t,t h a ti s ,a st h ef r a c t i o no fn e wg o o dm a t c h e sw i t h
employed searchers.
3.3 Wages and Search Intensity
Aw o r k e ra n daﬁrm split the joint surplus that their match generates. The size of each
party’s share is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, depending on their relative
bargaining powers. Wages are determined by taking the search intensity of workers as given,
while search intensity itself is chosen by workers taking as given the current wage.11
10This observation is consistent with empirical evidence, for example Burgess (1995), but also the discus-
sion in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). In Pissarides’ (1994) model with on-the-job search, workers cannot
direct their search and are randomly matched across good and bad vacancies.
11Note that since contracts are renegotiated at each point in time, ﬁrms cannot reduce quits by promising
higher wages. We discuss this point further below.
8We begin by specifying the asset values for workers and ﬁrms. The asset value of a good
ﬁrm with a job ﬁlled with a worker is given by the Bellman equation:
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t is the wage paid to the worker, Et the expectation operator conditional on the informa-
tion set at time t,a n dβt the discount factor, to be determined further below. Jobs survive
into the next period with probability (1 − ρ), and become vacant otherwise. The value V
g
t
of a vacancy for good jobs is:
V
g













With probability (1 − ρ)q
g
t the vacancy is ﬁlled and survives the separation shock. The
corresponding equations for bad jobs are:
Jb




(1 − ρ)(1 − stp
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t reduces the likelihood of a bad job remaining matched in the next period.
Free entry implies that the values of good and bad vacancies are driven to zero at any
point in time, such that V
g
t = V b
t =0 . With these conditions, solving the asset equations
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=( 1 − ρ)EtβtJb
t+1 =( 1− ρ)Etβt
"
Pbt+1At+1 − wb








The equations relate the expected cost of a posted vacancy to the expected beneﬁto fa
ﬁlled job. If, for example, the left-hand side of either equation were smaller than the right
hand side, entry is proﬁtable, so that the number of vacancies posted increases. This leads
to a fall in the probability of ﬁnding a worker qt, which depends on labor market tightness,
until no ex-ante proﬁts from posting vacancies remain.
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k(st) denotes the strictly convex cost of search in terms of intensity st, with k(0) = 0, k0 > 0,
and k00 > 0. The higher the search intensity, the more likely the worker is matched with
a good job. Convexity of the eﬀort function guarantees uniqueness of the optimal search
eﬀort. For st =0 , the worker either stays on the job or returns to unemployment after an
exogenous separation. Note that the worker enjoys the value of a good job only if that job
survives into the next period, with probability 1 − ρ.
The Nash bargaining solution divides the surplus of a match between the two parties at
each point in time. Depending on the type of job, the surplus for workers is Wi
t − Ut and
for ﬁrms Ji
t,i= g,b.12 Denoting the total surplus of a match by Si
t = Ji
t + Wi
t − Ut,t h e
wage has to be such that workers obtain a share Wi
t −Ut = ηSi
t, with the bargaining weight
0 <η<1. Firms receive the remainder Ji
t =( 1− η)Si
t.
The assumption that unemployed workers direct their search activity between the two
types of jobs yields a restriction on the costs of job creation and the match probabilities.
To see this, note that search for good jobs has the value:
U
g









while for bad jobs:
Ub
t = z + Etβt[pb
t(1 − ρ)Wb
t+1 +( 1− pb
t(1 − ρ))Ub
t+1]. (18)
In equilibrium, arbitrage by workers between sectors implies that U
g
t = Ub
t = Ut, for all
























from the deﬁnitions of the match probabilities. The measures of labor market tightness for
both types of jobs are exactly proportional to the relative costs of job creation.





t . Insert the respective equations, and solve for the wage, then collect
terms for the surplus of workers at time t +1 , and use the bargaining equation to replace
these terms with the expressions for J
g
t+1 or Jb
t+1. Finally, use the job creation conditions
and simplify. This yields the wage equation for good jobs:
w
g










t =0 , from the free entry condition.
10The wage is a function of the ﬂow return to production and the outside option of the worker.
Intuitively, the last term reﬂects the worker’s labor market prospects, should negotiations
break down. The worker obtains a fraction (1−η) of his share η/(1−η) of the value cg/q
g
t
of an alternative good job. Such a job is found with probability p
g
t. The last term can also












t + et). The outside option of the worker
not only depends on the number of unemployed workers searching for the same type of job,
but also on the number of employed job seekers. Note at this point that there is no recall.
That is, wages in previous jobs are not part of the outside options of a worker.
The wage equation for bad jobs is found in an analogous manner, using (1−η)(Wb
t −Ut)=
ηJb
t. It contains additional terms that reﬂect the presence of on-the-job search:
wb











making use of equation (19).13 On the one hand, searching workers incur the search cost
k(st), which reduces their surplus from the match, relative to the situation without search.
This increases the wage that ﬁrms need to pay the worker. On the other hand, the increased
likelihood of leaving the ﬁrm requires workers to accept a lower wage as a compensating
diﬀerential for ﬁrms. Another way to look at this is to realize that search on the job
is undertaken only if it raises total match value, as search gives workers the option to
earn more in the future, while the ﬁrm faces the additional risk of separation. Through
bargaining, ﬁrms obtain part of that option value.
Search intensity is chosen by the worker taking the wage as given, on the ground that
ﬁrms cannot directly observe the search eﬀort of workers. However, ﬁrms anticipate the
optimal choice that workers will make in equilibrium. The optimal search intensity is found
by maximizing the asset value of employment in a bad job with respect to individual search
intensity, st.T h a ti s :
Wb
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Search intensity rises with the probability of ﬁnding a good job, with the value of good
jobs, and falls with the value of bad jobs. If cg/q
g
t ≤ cb/qb
t no search would take place on














, showing that the wage in bad jobs depends
in a familiar way on the prospects of ﬁnding a similar job again, minus the expected value of ﬁnding a good
job.
11bad jobs. The factor η/(1−η) reﬂects the fact that workers only obtain a share of the total
value of a job.
The reader might expect to see a role of the wage for reducing the likelihood of workers
quitting. There is no such eﬀect because of the timing structure of the model and the nature
of Nash bargaining. Wages are continuously renegotiated so that currently paid wages have
no implications for wages paid next period, which will be newly negotiated. But next
period’s payments are what motitvates worker search this period. If ﬁrms could commit to
wages for more than a period, then adjusting today’s wage would have an eﬀect on search
intensity and thus quitting. However, we do observe in the model a negative correlation
between wages and the likelihood of quitting. This arises from the incentive to search on
low wage jobs, not because ﬁrms raise wages to maximize proﬁts by reducing turnover.14
3.4 Closing the Model
Households choose consumption to maximize lifetime utility. Each household is endowed
with a unit of labor which is supplied inelastically to the labor market. The optimization

















t + πt, (25)
where ct is consumption, yl
t is income earned from providing labor services to ﬁrms in good
and bad sectors, and πt is residual proﬁts from the ﬁrms. Labor is supplied inelastically,
with a disutility of h suﬀered if the agents works (χt =1 ) and a value of leisure or household
production z, enjoyed if unemployed. We normalize h =0since this choice does not aﬀect
the search and matching process. 0 <β<1 is the household’s discount factor, and τ>0
is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
We assume perfect risk-sharing among the households and a complete asset market.15
This implies that ﬁrms use the household’s intertemporal rate of substitution to evaluate
their proﬁts t r e a m s .U s i n gt h eh o u s e h o l d ’ sﬁrst order condition for consumption, the utility-
14This logic applies however to models of wage posting, such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
15To avoid complications from heterogeneity in workers’ asset positions, we follow Merz (1995) and An-
dolfatto (1996) in assuming a large number of members of families which perfectly insure each other against
ﬂuctuations in income. This is a commonly used device in business cycle models with (possibly) heteroge-
neous agents.







In the absence of capital or, for instance, government borrowing, households cannot engage
in consumption smoothing in the usual manner. However, the intertemporal trade-oﬀ in-
herent in the creation of vacancies allows substitution of consumption over time through
increases in employment. We will discuss this notion in more detail below.
In equilibrium, the income that acrues to the household is:
yl




where the resources lost by posting vacancies are subtracted. Since sectoral production
technologies as well as the aggregator function are constant returns to scale, residual proﬁts
are identicaly equal to zero. Income therefore consists of wage payments to employed
workers. The equations describing the model economy are collected in the Appendix.
4 Calibration and Model Solution
We now proceed by computing the non-stochastic steady state around which the equation
system is then linearized. The resulting linear rational expectations model is solved by the
method described in Sims (2002). We assign numerical values to the structural parame-
ters in order to conduct a quantitative analysis. Since pertinent information may not be
available for some parameters, we compute these indirectly from the steady-state values
of quantiﬁable endogenous variables. The calibration is somewhat more diﬃcult than in
models without on the job search, as aggregate statistics can not easily be matched with
corresponding model statistics. In what follows we describe our benchmark parameteriza-
tion, which we then modify in subsequent sections. The calibration is summarized in Table
2.
We start with the separation rate and set ρ =0 .1. This value covers both exogenous
job destruction as well as quits into unemployment or movements out of the labor force.
The unemployment rate is set to 12%, i.e., u =0 .12. The corresponding mass of workers
participating in the production process is given by n =1− u. The unemployment rate is
chosen higher than that commonly observed in the data to take into account workers that
are only loosely attached to the labor force, such as discouraged workers or workers engaging
in home production. Once the opportunity arises, these (potential) workers participate in
13the matching market.16
We calibrate the steady-state job-to-job transition rate as 0.06 which corresponds in our
modeling framework to the variable epg/n, the number of workers in bad jobs who move
on to good jobs relative to total employment. For the matching function itself, we choose
a Cobb-Douglas functional form that is identical in both sectors with elasticity parameter
µ =0 .4,s ot h a tmg = Mgv1−µ
g (ug + e)
µ and mb = Mbv1−µ
g u
µ
b.17 The level parameters Mg,
Mb are chosen to imply an average ﬁrm matching probability of 0.7, which is a commonly
used value in the literature. This leads to Mg =0 .6 and Mb =0 .6. The implied steady
state sectoral matching rates, that is, the probability that a ﬁrm in the good or bad sector
ﬁnds an employee, are, respectively, 0.77 and 0.63.
Existence of a high wage (‘good’) sector rests on the assumption that cg >c b.W e
assume that job creation costs for good ﬁrms are three times as large as for bad ﬁrms and
set cb =0 .2. The aggregator function of sectoral production into economy-wide output is
of the CES-type. For simplicity, we choose γ =0 . Furthermore, impose that prices are
about equal, and that wages are higher in the good job sector than in the bad job sector.
This implies a weight of α =0 .4 on production from bad jobs. It can be interpreted as a
productivity diﬀerential.
The costs of searching on the job are assumed to be strictly increasing and convex in
the search intensity. We use k(s)=κsσ,w h e r eκ>0, σ>1. In our benchmark calibration
we choose σ =1 .1. However, this is one of our main parameters of interest and we will
present and discuss the implications of variations in the search elasticity. A value close to
one appears most plausible for reasons discussed below. The scale parameter κ is not chosen
independently, but is computed implicitly to be consistent with the calibrated steady state.
We ﬁnd κ =0 .04.18
The parameters describing the household are standard. We choose a coeﬃcient of rela-
tive risk aversion τ =1 , and a discount factor β =0 .98. The worker’s share in the surplus
of the match is η =0 .5. There is no independent information available on the utility value
of household production z. Reverse calibration of the unemployment rate, however, implies
that z =0 .39.
16This argument follows Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
17It needs to be pointed out that empirical estimates of this elasticity parameter are biased if there is
on-the-job search (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, for the estimation). We are aware of no empirical
study of the matching function that takes on-the-job search into account.
18Incidentally, this also implies a steady state value for the search intensity of employed job seekers of
s =0 .26. Mortensen (1994) reports that their search intensity is 1/5 of that of unemployed seekers (which
we assume to be one).
14Finally, we need to calibrate the shock process. The (logarithm of the) aggregate pro-
ductivity shock is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with coeﬃcient ρA =0 .90.A s i s
common in the literature we choose an innovation variance such that the baseline model’s
predictions match the standard deviation of U.S. GDP, which is 1.62%. While this is not
a robust procedure, it is not essential for our approach since we do not evaluate the model
along this dimension. What matters are the relative volatilities of the variables of interest.
Consequently, the standard deviation of technology is set to σε =0 .0049.
5M o d e l A n a l y s i s
This section reports the main ﬁndings of our benchmark model. To recapitulate, we have
developed a two-sector labor market model of search and matching, where workers can
engage in on-the-job search. First, we discuss the implications of on-the-job search for
the model’s steady state. Secondly, we report impulse responses to technology shocks and
discuss their robustness. Finally, summary statistics from the data are compared with the
corresponding statistics from the simulated model.
5.1 Steady State Implications
In the non-stochastic steady state equilibrium, about 30% of jobs are bad, and search
intensity is about one third. In other words, 10% of the labor force are eﬀectively searching
on the job. There is a relatively low number of unemployed workers looking for good jobs
(1.3%), while the remainder of the unemployed (10.7%) search for bad jobs. Note that this
is an endogenous response of the unemployed to the competition for good jobs that face
with employed seekers. The measure of vacancies is expressed in relation to the labor force
and is 7.5 percent for good jobs, and 15.6 percent for bad jobs. Remember that the labor
force is normalized to one. The resulting probabilities to be matched within the following
quarter is for ﬁrms 0.75 (good vacancies) and 0.57 (bad vacancies), while for workers, the
probabilities to be matched with a good job are 0.43 and for a bad job 0.67. In line with
intuition, the queue of workers looking for good employment is longer, in the sense that
match probabilities are lower. The ﬂow of new good matches per period is 0.057 and for
new bad matches is 0.092. The larger amount of bad matches reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tt h e
workers ﬂowing from bad to good jobs are being replaced at the industry level.19 Finally,
note that wages for good jobs are slightly higher than for bad jobs, the diﬀerence is about 4
19The ﬂows in the bad job sector can be interpreted as either reﬂecting replacement hiring at the ﬁrm
level, or as job destruction in some ﬁrms, while others expand, holding total industry employment steady.
15percent. The wage diﬀererence is not essential though for on-the-job search. What matters
is the diﬀerence between the asset values of employment in the two sectors.
5.2 Impulse Response Analysis
The importance of on-the-job search for the dynamics of the economy becomes strikingly
apparent in the impulse responses. For illustration, consider a positive, one percent shock
to productivity. First of all, observe that this leads to an increase of employment in both
sectors, but a relatively stronger increase in employment in good jobs. The reason is that
relative to aggregate productivity, the cost diﬀerential for creating either job type has now
become lower. This stimulates good job creation. Accordingly, output by good jobs rises
somewhat more.
Next consider worker ﬂows. Search intensity, and with it the eﬀective amount of on-
the-job searchers, e, shoots up, leading to a strong increase in subsequent job-to-job transi-
tions.20 Search activity rises mainly due to the increased availability of good employment
opportunities, but also due to a rising wage diﬀerential. The increased availability of search-
ing workers further stimulates the opening of good vacancies. At the same time, rising quits
also stimulate posting of bad vacancies, to ﬁnd replacements. Unemployed workers react
to the competition with employed workers by directing their search to bad jobs. Thus, in
a boom, the fraction of unemployed workers ﬁnding employment in good jobs falls, and of
those ﬁnding bad jobs rises. This eﬀect would be absent without search on the job. Overall,
unemployment falls substantially.
Interestingly, wages rise only by half as much as productivity, a direct result of the rising
competition between employed and unemployed job seekers. Wages in bad jobs rise but by
less than in good jobs. Remember that both good and bad wages depend on a job’s output,
the outside beneﬁt of workers, which is constant, and the expected value of good jobs, due to
unemployed workers’ directed search. The wage in bad jobs rises by less, however, because
of the higher search intensity. While search has a positive impact on the present value of
the match for workers, it reduces the value of the match to ﬁrms. But there is a net rise in
the joint match surplus, of which ﬁrms obtain a slice.
On impact, output rises as much as productivity. However, after that, output does not
move in line with the process for productivity. It continues to rise, until, after about 5
20Suppose the shock were permanent. Then the initial increase in on-the-job search is above the higher
level that obtains in the new long-run steady state. We thus observe an “overshooting” behavior as noted
by Pissarides (1994). Of course, with an transitory aggregate shock, the economy converges back to the
original steady state.
16quarters, it begins to fall. Thus changes in productivity have persistent eﬀects, indicating
that search on the job adds substantial propagation to the model. Similarly, employment
has a hump-shaped response. It is important to realize that this is not caused by the
job heterogeneity in the model. Simulations of the model without employed search (not
reported here) show that the impulse responses of that model are very similar to those of a
standard one-sector model, such as those by Andolfatto (1996) or Merz (1995).
It is important to recognize the role of the aggregate household’s discount factor, βt,
which ﬁrms use to discount future proﬁts. Time variation in the discount factor smoothes
consumption over time. This is achieved through its eﬀect on vacancy creation. In a boom,
high labor productivity induces expansion of employment, and thus the posting of vacancies.
Since consumers have to give up consumption for ﬁrms’ investment in employment, the
interest rate rises, mitigating some of the eﬀect. Still, vacancies rise substantially in response
to the shock. In a partial equilibrium model with a constant interest rate, the eﬀect would
be even larger. In future periods, the interest rate falls, allowing higher consumption, and
depletion of the employment stock back to the steady-state.
5.3 Simulation Results
We now turn to a discussion of the business cycle statistics computed from our benchmark
model. Table 3 shows sample moments for the labor market variables of interest. We ﬁrst
evaluate the success of our benchmark speciﬁcation in matching the standard deviations
in the data conditional on aggregate technology shocks. Since we calibrate the variance
of technology shocks to match the volatility of U.S. GDP we only evaluate the model’s
predictions based on relative volatilities. We ﬁnd that, in general, the variables in the model
are only slightly less volatile than in the data, in particular, vacancies, unemployment, and
labor market tightness.
The data yield strong predictions with respect to contemporaneous correlations. First
and foremost is the Beveridge-curve, the negative correlation of unemployment and va-
cancies over the business cycle. In U.S data this correlation is −0.95. Our benchmark
calibration comes extremely close in matching this stylized fact.21 W ea r ea l s oa b l et o
replicate the negative comovement of unemployment with all other aggregate variables of
interest. For instance, the unemployment rate is highly negatively, though not perfectly,
correlated with the job-to-job transition rate. When an adverse technology shock raises
unemployment, search intensity falls due to declining probability of ﬁnding jobs. Workers
21For their model, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) report a correlation of only −0.26.S e e a l s o t h e
interesting discussion in Shimer (2003).
17are therefore less likely to engage in on-the-job search so that relatively fewer workers in
bad jobs move on to better ones. Interestingly, our two measures of labor market tightness
are perfectly correlated on account of the strong comovement of search intensity with GDP.
However, the inclusive measure is substantially less volatile.
The volatility of the quit rate comes very close to what is observed in the data, a result
of the highly responsive search intensity. The supply of additional searchers holds the ratio
of vacancies to unemployment plus employed search relatively stable. At the same time, it
keeps the incentives high for ﬁrms to post vacancies. We also see the very high procylicality
of job-to-job quits in terms of the correlation with output. A noteworthy exception is the
high correlation of wages and on the job search in the model, in contrast to the data.
Note at this point that the match between wages in model and data cannot be perfect
for two reasons. One is empirical: wages are measured for heterogeneous workers, and thus
combine aggregate and composition eﬀects. The second reason is theoretical. Wages are best
understood as a dividend payment on an asset, employment. The Nash bargaining approach
yields a certain value of this asset, and a corresponding payment stream. However, many
payment streams are consistent with that asset value. What matters for the economics of
the model is how the asset values and bargaining positions of agents change in response to
shocks, irrespective of the currently paid wages.
6 Discussion
6.1 The Role of Search Intensity and Job Heterogeneity
Why does the cyclicality of job-to-job quits change the behavior of the economy so substan-
tially? This is best understood as the result of an interaction between rising search eﬀort
and the heterogeneity of posted vacancies. On the one hand, rising search eﬀort raises good
ﬁrms’ incentives to post vacancies. Without employed searchers, the creation of good jobs is
constrained by the fall in the number of unemployed searchers and the strong rise in wages.
On the other hand, the increasing availability of good jobs further encourages on-the-job
search. Thus a small rise in productivity leads to large changes in the incentives to search
and posting vacancies, which explains that unemployment falls substantially even though
competition with employed job seekers rises. Only slowly do these incentives fall back to
their steady state levels.
The role of search intensity can be further illustrated by varying the elasticity of search
eﬀort. The results are depicted in Figure 3. As σ approaches one from above, the quit
rate and labor market tightness become exceedingly volatile. Since the responsiveness of
18search costs to changing search eﬀort declines, the volatility of job-to-job quits rises. Even
though the standard and our modiﬁed measures of labor market tightness, θ = v/u and
θ∗ = v/(u+e), are almost perfectly correlated, their volatility is strikingly diﬀerent. While
the former is very responsive to changes in σ, the latter is not at all. The reason is that as
unemployment falls, employed search rises, keeping the incentives for vacancy creation high
after a favorable aggregate shock. The theoretical counterpart in our model, vg/(ug + e),
behaves similarly. Since this measure of labor market tightness aﬀects wages, they are
much less volatile than in the case without on-the-job search. In this sense, on-the-job
search endogenously generates wage rigidity.
Even though the choice of the search cost elasticity of σ =1 .1 is favorable to our re-
sults, it appears also most plausible. Merz (1995) chooses a value of one for unemployed
searchers.22 After paying a ﬁxed cost of beginning to search, the marginal cost of search
not likely to rise substantially: sending out one more application cannot add much cost.
For large numbers, there is obviously a time constraint. Thus average search cost may be
declining at ﬁrst before rising at very high intensity. Another argument for a low σ is that
on-the-job search activity in the model represents both the intensive and the extensive mar-
gin. Thus, also the number of searchers may change substantially as aggregate conditions
change.23
As is evident from the impulse responses the presence of time-varying on-the-job search
activity leads to persistent movements of output after shocks to technology. We investigate
this issue further by analyzing modiﬁcations to our benchmark speciﬁcation. First, we shut
down on-the-job search over the business cycle. That is, we impose st = s, ∀t.W h i l e
there is still employed search in the steady state — and optimally chosen according to Eq.
(23) —, workers are not allowed to adapt their search intensity to changing business cycle
conditions. Secondly, we remove the possibility of on-the-job search entirely, thereby only
preserving the two-sector, good job/bad job structure.24
Figure 4 depicts impulse responses of output to a 1% productivity shock. The eﬀect
of on-the-job search on magniﬁcation and persistence is strikingly evident. The output
response for the model without employed search essentially reﬂects the underlying produc-
tivity process.25 It is this inability of the search and matching model that has been widely
22While this leads to a unique equilibrium of the planner solution she presents, the choice of individual
workers is not determined.
23Pissarides (1994) models search at the extensive margin by having workers with diﬀerent levels of speciﬁc
human capital choose to search depending on their outside options.
24The resulting speciﬁcation can be thought of as a dynamic general equilibrium version of Acemoglu
(2001). Krause and Lubik (2004) discuss its business cycle implications in more detail.
25Incidentally, the behavior of this model speciﬁcation is virtually identical to a standard, one-sector search
19discussed in the literature (see, for instance, Den Haan et. al., 2000). In contrast, on-the-job
search provides strong ampliﬁcation as well as persistence eﬀects on output as adjustment
to the steady state is much slower. With constant search eﬀort the peak response is reached
two periods after impact, and after three periods with time-varying search eﬀort. Ampliﬁ-
cation occurs as workers in bad jobs move onto good jobs so that bad vacancies are posted.
This attracts searchers from the unemployed even in the case of constant search intensity.
When workers in the bad sector can optimally choose their search eﬀort, this transmission
mechanism is ampliﬁed further, as discussed above.
The endogenous persistence due to on-the-job search is therefore helpful in explaining
the autocorrelation patterns in U.S. data. Figure 5 depicts the autocorrelation functions of
U.S. GDP growth rates over the period 1948:1-2002:4 and for the three model speciﬁcations
discussed above. The lack of propagation in the model without on-the-job search is well
documented by a ﬂat autocorrelation function around zero. The benchmark model, on the
other hand, captures U.S. output dynamics remarkably well, even slightly overpredicting
the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. In contrast, the search and matching model of Den Haan,
Ramey, Watson (2000) yields magniﬁcation and more realistic autocorrelations of output by
endogenizing the job destruction rate and including capital accumulation. Here, we obtain
very similar results with a ﬁxed job destruction rate but employed search.26
6.2 Relation to Previous Work
The literature that confronted the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model with the data
typically focused on the performance of the model along the dimension it was designed
to explain, namely the behavior of job creation and destruction. A well-known example
is Cole and Rogerson (1999), who ﬁnd that the model performs well if the steady-state
unemployment rate is high. The argument is that the relevant pool of searchers in the labor
market is high, based on the ﬁndings of Blanchard and Diamond (1990). Den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000) achieve plausible job ﬂows by modeling endogenous job destruction along
with capital. As mentioned, Hall (2003) and Shimer (2003) are the ﬁrst to consider the
ability of the search and matching framework to quantitatively match the cyclical behavior
of unemployment and vacancies. It appears that in all papers, the performance of the model
is enhanced by an assumption that reduces the cyclicality of hiring costs or wages. This
can either be a large unemployment pool, or, in the case of Hall and Shimer, wage rigidity.
and matching framework. Results for the latter are not reported in order to conserve space.
26Note that Den Haan et al. focus on the behavior of job creation and destruction, but they do not report
results concerning vacancies and unemployment.
20In our model, it is on-the-job search motivated by job heterogeneity which endogenously
reduces the volatilities of both wages and hiring costs.
Comparing our model with other approaches in the literature, consider ﬁrst Pissarides’
(1994) search model with on-the-job search. Our model shares with it the existence of
two job types. In his deterministic model, jobs also diﬀer in terms of creation costs and
productivity, but technology is linear, and prices and the interest rate are constant. Workers
diﬀer in their job-speciﬁc skills, and in response to permanent changes in productivity, more
workers choose to search on the job, at constant search intensity. In contrast to Pissarides,
we ﬁnd that employed job search does not reduce the volatility of unemployment, but
increases it. One reason is that employed and unemployed workers can direct their search
eﬀort to the sectors where the prospect of ﬁnding a match are highest, rather than being
randomly matched. This makes the reallocation of labor more eﬃcient and leads to an
ampliﬁcation of shocks.
Pissarides (2000) has a diﬀerent structure. Jobs diﬀer by idiosyncratic productivity
levels, drawn from a continuous distribution. With workers’ choice to search or not, this
implies two thresholds in terms of productivity. Below one threshold workers have an
incentive to search for better employment, participating in the common matching market.
N e wm a t c h e ss t a r ta tt h eh i g h e s tp o s s i b l ep r o ductivity. Below the second threshold, which
is lower than the ﬁrst, the joint value of the match with the ﬁrm is below the parties’
outside option, leading to job destruction. Since all jobs are created at the highest possible
productivity level, all vacancies are the same for employed and unemployed workers. Thus
quits are not replaced by ﬁrms and always lead to job destruction.
Mortensen (1994) simulates a stochastic version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model,
with the addition of on-the-job search, modeled at the extensive margin. The presence
of employed search helps in explaining the negative correlation between job creation and
destruction, which we discussed above. The model also features a procyclical quit rate, with
workers being randomly matched to the most productive jobs. Both Pissarides (1994, 2000)
and Mortensen do not explore the link between vacancies, unemployment and job-to-job
ﬂows or the eﬀects on wage setting.
On-the-job search is a central element of theories of the wage distribution based on job
competition and wage posting, such as Mortensen (2003) or Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, Robin
(2003). These models derive an endogenous steady-state wage distribution from the com-
petition of ﬁrms for workers. Paying a high wage reduces the likelihood of workers quitting
which oﬀsets the wage cost. Firms that pay high wages and low wages co-exist, which gives
21unemployed workers incentives to search more intensively. The equilibrium is more eﬃcient
than the one with no wage dispersion. However, wages are posted and are kept constant
throughout employment. This is a key diﬀerence to the approach used here. We are not
aware, though, of attempts to model the out-of-steady state dynamics of such frameworks.
Another approach to motivate search on the job is to introduce varying workers pref-
erences or heterogeneous match quality. Employed workers then either search because of a
deterioration of their satisfaction with their job (or an improvement in outside options), or
they search because the quality of their match with the ﬁrm turns out to be unsatisfactory.
The latter may be the result of learning about the job, and mostly applies to workers at
the beginning of their life cycle.
6.3 Further Robustness Discussion and Potential Extensions
By modeling search intensity as the main margin of adjustment of employed job search,
we leave the extensive margin out of the picture. It is clear that empirically the number
of searchers varies over the business cycle, with searchers being inactive until prospects
brighten. This mirrors the behavior of discouraged workers and those out of the labor
f o r c e ,w h i c hm a yb e g i ns e a r c hi ng o o dt i m e s . H o w e v e r ,t h et w oj o bt y p e si nt h ep r e s e n t
model are suﬃciently diﬀerent so that all workers in bad jobs search. Changes in the number
of searchers come about exclusively through changes in employment in bad jobs.
In other models employed search is mainly varied at the extensive margin and a lump
sum is paid for searching.27 Proceeding along those lines would require specifying a distri-
bution of idiosyncratic match productivities andr e s u l ti na no p t i m a lt h r e s h o l db e l o ww h i c h
workers earn a return to work so low that incuring the search cost is justiﬁed. It would be
possible to generate similar results as with our model, albeit at the cost of increasing com-
plexity. Particularly tracking the distribution of idiosyncratic productivities should prove
cumbersome if they are persistent. Furthermore, it would naturally require consideration of
an endogenous job destruction threshold for productivities below which jobs are destroyed.
An advantage would be that it may help to explain the joint dynamics of ﬁrm-initiated
separations (layoﬀs due to job destruction) and worker-initiated separations (quits into un-
employment or to another job). It is well-known that the sum of the two is relatively stable
over the cycle.28 For clarity, we chose to exclude this possibility. However, all the important
27Examples are Pissarides (1994) and Mortensen (1994). In steady-state labor models, Cahuc, Postel-
Vinay, Robin (1999) make similar assumptions.
28The high procylicality of job-to-job quits is the a logical consequence of the countercyclical job destruc-
tion and quits for other reasons. See Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Akerlof et al. (1988).
22eﬀects are captured by variation in search intensity.
We abstain from any experiments involving exogenous job destruction shocks. These
may be interpreted as reallocation shocks, which stimulate job reallocation in the absence
of aggregate disturbances. The reason is that these are intrinsically endogenous choices by
ﬁrms, a response to changed economic conditions. However, experimenting with such shocks
is instructive. Shimer (2003) shows that a negative job destruction shock increases vacancies,
b u ta tt h es a m et i m eu n e m p l o y m e n ta sw e l l . T h el a r g e rp o o lo fs e a r c h e r sm a k e sﬁnding
worker for ﬁrms cheaper. We identify the same problem in a GE model with endogenous job
destruction where the positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies dominates
the negative correlation that increased job creation should induce. In fact, even job creation
and destruction are positively correlated.29 A deeper reason is that the cost of adjusting
employment at the ﬁring margin is cyclically less sensitive for ﬁrms with homogeneous labor
than that of using the hiring margin. From this perspective, the job heterogeneity in the
present model can explain why net employment expansions may not be accomodated by
merely ﬁring less workers in bad jobs.
The CES aggregator leaves open whether worker mobility is between or within industries.
The literature seems to suggest the latter. Using Danish data, Albaek and Sorensen (1998)
ﬁnd that job to job transitions are frequent between diﬀerent ﬁrm-size classes, but less
frequent between industries. They ﬁnd that a substantial amount of worker reallocation
of between manufacturing establishments is from small to large ﬁrms. In light of the well-
known ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect this appears plausible.
While the model has no capital, it nevertheless features a form of investment, namely in
vacancies. Consumption is in fact output minust h ec o s t so fv a c a n c yp o s t i n g .T h i si n v e s t -
ment needs to be made in order to increase the stock of workers. In that sense, labor and
capital are perfect complements. For the household, it is a means to smooth consumption
over time. Inclusion of capital would introduce an additional smoothing element. It is
possible that an interaction between capital and on-the-job search would further strengthen
the propagation of shocks in the model, since capital would allow carrying the eﬀects of pro-
ductivity into the future. The incentive for employed search would then also be maintained
for a longer time, with the eﬀects described earlier.
29See Krause and Lubik (2003). Also Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Cole and Rogerson (1999) discuss
this issue. The former resolve it by assuming a lower elasticity of the matching function with respect the
unemployment. The latter suggest increasing the relevant pool of searchers to include those not in the labor
force. This amounts to twice the unemployment pool. We make a similar assumption here.
237C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented a model of labor market d y n a m i c si nw h i c hs e a r c ho nt h ej o bp l a y s
a crucial role. The main conclusion is that it is possible to explain the joint dynamics
of vacancies, unemployment, and productivity without resorting to any imperfection other
than search and matching frictions. In particular, we do not require wages to be rigid in
order to bring the model closer to the data. Instead, increased search eﬀort by employed
workers serves to hold their outside options tame. This endogenously delivers wage rigidity,
and thus maintains strong incentives for ﬁrms to post vacancies in a boom.
However, the ﬁndings are not meant to deny an potentially important role for (real) wage
rigidity. Hall (2003) and Shimer (2003) suggest this as a solution to the empirical diﬃculties
they identiﬁed with Mortensen-Pissarides model. Also in our model, wage rigidity would
further amplify the cyclical response of vacancies, unemployment and job-to-job ﬂows. Hall
(2004) has made an interesting advance modeling wage setting based on social norms, which
allows wages even for new hires to be rigid. In previous work, we applied this idea in a
monetary business cycle model with search frictions.30
The model delivers a rich description of the labor market over the business cycle. Booms
are times which allow employed workers to upgrade into better jobs, while opening jobs for
unemployed workers, albeit of lower quality. The reallocation of labor to more productive
units is facilitated by direct job-to-job transitions, rather than requiring movements of
workers through the unemployment pool.31 One fundamental reason for worker mobility
is the heterogeneity of jobs which gives rise to diﬀerences in the returns to workers. The
creation of good jobs is ampliﬁed by the rising intensity of search by employed workers.
Even though the model with on-the-job search explains important dimensions of the data
surprisingly well, other aspects of reality may be worthwhile incorporating. Introduction
of worker heterogeneity would allow to track which types of workers are hired into which
types of jobs. In recessions, skilled worker may be parked in bad jobs only to transit to
better jobs when conditions improve. Less skilled workers might ﬁnd employment in good
sectors, but only as long as favorable conditions prevail and face higher separation risk.
The propagation that the model implies may have important implications for business
30Krause and Lubik (2003).
31Ad i ﬀerent interpretation of the demand structure also comes to mind. The good job-bad job distinction
might better be reﬂecting old and new jobs in a vintage model. In that case, search on the job could accelerate
the creation of new vintages at the technological frontier. It would also induce destruction of less productive
units, with diﬀerent implications for the eﬃciency of creative destruction. See Caballero and Hammour
(1995).
24cycle analysis. In the response to a positive productivity shock, output peaked after a
number of quarters, not in the ﬁrst period, as the process for productivity suggests. Higher
labor productivity induces employed workers to search for better jobs. This feeds back into
the incentives for ﬁrms to continue posting vacancies for a protracted period. Only slowly
does this eﬀect appear to fade. Interestingly, we obtain a magnifaction of shocks that is
about as large as in Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), even though we do not include
capital or a variable destruction rate. We intend to explore the propagation properties of
on-the-job search in future work.
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4. Evolution of employment:
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10. Sectoral and aggregate output:
yg,t = Atn
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ct = yt − cgvg,t − cbvb,t.
BL i n e a r i z e d S y s t e m
1. Good jobs creation, with Xg =( 1− β(1 − ρ))/(PgA − wg)
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2815. Price good output
b Pgt − (1 − γ)b yt +( 1− γ)b ygt =0
16. Price bad output
b Pbt − (1 − γ)b yt +( 1− γ)b ybt =0
17. Directed search condition
b p
g
t + b qb
t − b pb
t − b q
g
t =0
18. Aggregate Income (= consumption)
cb ct − yb yt + cgvgb v
g
t + cbvbb vb
t =0
19. Bad matches deﬁned
b qb
t − b mb
t + b vb
t =0
20. Good matches deﬁned
b q
g
t − b m
g
t + b v
g
t =0
21. Unemployment in bad jobs
b pb
t − b mb
t + b ub
t =0
22. Unemployment in good jobs and eﬀective search
b p
g












b At = ρA b At−1 + εAt
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32Table 1: U.S. Business Cycle Statistics
YWNY
N UV θ Q R
Standard Deviation
1.62 0.69 0.81 0.83 6.90 8.27 14.96 9.81
Cross-Correlations
YWNY
N UV θ Q R
Y 1 0.57 0.82 0.69 -0.87 0.92 0.91 0.91
W — 1 0.27 0.66 -0.42 0.51 0.47 0.05
N — — 1 0.16 -0.93 0.88 0.91 0.91
Y
N — — — 1 -0.34 0.49 0.43 0.44
U — — — — 1 -0.95 -0.98 -0.93
V — — — — — 1 0.99 0.94
θ ———— — — 1 0 . 9 5
QR 1
33Table 2: Model Parameters and Calibration
Parameter Value Description
µ 0.4 Match Elasticity
Mg 0.6 Level Parameter
Mb 0.6 Level Parameter
cg 0.16 Good Job Creation Cost
cb 0.04 Bad Job Creation Cost
ρ 0.1 Separation Rate
σ 1.1 Search Elasticity
η 0.5 Nash Bargaining Share
α 0.4 CES-Weight
γ 0 Substitution Elasticity
β 0.98 Discount Factor
τ 1 Intertemporal Substitution Elasticity
u 0.12 Unemployment Rate
ζ 0.06 Quit Rate
z 0.39 Value of Home Production
κ 0.04 Search Cost Function Parameter
34Table 3: Benchmark Simulation
Standard Deviations
YW NY
N UV θ θ n QR
(rel. to Y )
1.62 0.19 0.56 0.27 6.09 5.43 11.17 2.57 10.05
Cross-Correlations
YWNY
N UV θ Q R
Y 1 0.83 0.99 0.97 -0.99 0.93 0.99 0.96
W - 1 0.81 0.86 -0.75 0.97 0.88 0.94
N - - 1 0.54 -1.0 0.87 0.97 0.92
Y/N - - - 1 -0.54 0.84 0.87 0.96
U - - - - 1 -0.87 -0.97 -0.92
V - - - - - 1 0.96 0.99
θ ---- - -1 0 . 9 8
QR ---- - - - 1














































Figure 1: Vacancies, Unemployment and Quits
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Productivity Shock







































Figure 3: Search Elasticity and Aggregate Volatilities























Benchmark             
Constant Search Effort
No On−the−Job Search  
Figure 4: Impulse Responses of Output to a 1% Productivity Shock











































No On−the−Job Search 
Figure 5: Autocorrelations of Output Growth Rates
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